

*Closing remarks of
General Cabell (substituting
for Mr. Dulles) 21 October
1960*

Notes on General Cabell's Talk in Project USEFUL

Since CIA has need for a few informed persons stashed away in the Services, the session has been of value to the Agency, General Charles P. Cabell, Deputy Director, on 21 October told officers attending Project USEFUL number seven. He said that he hoped informing them had not been a waste of the officers' time. The Agency has to call on the Services for a great deal of help, sometimes apparently screwball. It cannot support the Services as the Services are called on to support it. In informing the group about the Agency, the Agency itself has learned much and rendered itself a service.

General Cabell in explaining that he was substituting for Mr. Dulles, said circumstances had caught up with the Director in preventing his appearance before the group. Mr. Dulles, who was leaving tomorrow for two weeks away from Washington, had been caught in the press of business saved up for the last day by all sorts of people. Previously Mr. Dulles had always enjoyed talking at the USEFUL sessions.

A call for questions the answers to which might not have been covered in the course next came from General Cabell. From the audience questions themselves often could not be heard; but General Cabell's answers, the gist of which follows, make evident what the questions were.

When something is planned requiring quick concurrence of a theater commander, there is no lack of a mechanism for getting it. The Agency station chief near the post of the theater commander wanders around and keeps him informed. In Europe, the station [REDACTED] There is nothing cumbersome or formal involved.

In such operations as the U-2, there is not a complete stand-down. There is, however, the feeling for a need to be doubly cautious. A political campaign, too, cubes the sensitivity of such situations. In the Agency's operations, a strong determination is needed to stay out of the bureaucratic pattern. The Agency does have people who will stick out their necks. That attitude is fostered, because the Agency must have the offensive spirit. The world is a changing world, however, - one that has closed the door on things that once could have been done in Europe. Increases in Soviet Bloc security skills also make more difficult the carrying out of assignments and put the Agency on its mettle.

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No grey area gap exists between the activities of the Agency and those of the Services. There is, though, a problem of coordination. Both sides are going beyond the limits set by their missions. A temporary gap might come during change-over from peace to war. The job in peace is getting human assets. Do you organize a net for immediate results or for the sole purpose of being in place in time of war? A compromise must be made between utilization in time of peace and being in place in time of war. A net merely in place and non-productive in peacetime tends of itself to become blown. When it does, of course, its services both in peace and war are lost. That is the compromise rather the gap. Strangely enough it is the same jokers who want assets safely in place in time of war who put the bee on the Agency to get results right now.

General Cabell said that he would rather not see a single national intelligence organization. A drive to the common good comes from each agency and service. It is important, though, that the agencies and the services do not make centralization inevitable by overlapping, lack of coordination, and lack of cooperation.

The access to information on what is going on in intelligence and to the whole intelligence picture is something for each presidential candidate to determine for himself. The Director has opened himself to any briefing, at any time, and in any place.

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The Agency makes no attempts at propaganda within the United States. Perhaps the most sensitive area in all American democracy is attempting to influence the pattern of United States citizens' thoughts.

The Director is charged with the responsibility for coordination of operational information in liaison. In clandestine operations, there must be a zealous guarding of sources. People must not know who the agent is; the way to keep a secret is to have few sharers.

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The USSR probably has atomic submarines. The Soviets, however, have not yet been given credit for atomic-weapon-equipped submarines.

When an inter-community problem cannot be solved by laying it before the United States Intelligence Board and getting agreement there, it goes to "our betters."

The National Security Board is really the President, and it changes membership with a change in administration. Being advisory, the board does not make decisions. Each presidential candidate is sophisticated in intelligence practices and the need for intelligence, and therefore would not change much. In fact, government practices are being accepted as unchanging. CIA problems therefore probably will not change much with a shift in administrations. The only danger here is that a candidate may become committed to the extent of radically changing practices, for instance, in Cuba.

One of the most discouraging things people in intelligence work face is the lack of responsibility in leaking information. Often doing so pulls the rug from under promising operations. The leakage must be frustrating to the President. No one person knows how to overcome leaks. Each must discourage this human tendency to the extent that he can.

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